End of the standoff between the State of Mali and Barrick Gold: a look back at the case that shook Africa’s mining sector.

It was a saga that kept Mali’s and the international mining community on edge for just over forty months. An open conflict pitted Barrick Gold against the State of Mali, which was determined to address alleged shortcomings in sector governance following an audit conducted by the Mazars firm. On 24 November 2025, the two parties finally reached an agreement. POINT FOCUS takes you back through the key stages of this eventful story.

From the National Consultations to the mining-sector audit

It began with a national political dialogue from which a strong recommendation emerged: “Audit all mining permits, particularly those whose beneficiaries do not comply with environmental protection regulations.”

The National Consultations on Refoundation thus gave the Transition authorities an opportunity to shake up the system and dissect a sector which, it was said, did not yet truly make Mali’s gold shine for all Malians, to use the well-worn expression.

Following this recommendation, a sector audit was launched. Mazars Senegal, which claims “more than 120 staff made up of chartered accountants, financial auditors, lawyers and tax experts”, partnered with the Malian firm Iventus Mining to assemble a multidisciplinary team and a work programme spanning several months.

On 23 March 2023, a report was submitted to Mali’s Head of State. That day, Mamou Touré—presented by the Presidency’s communications team as the coordinator of the Iventus–Mazars firms—highlighted “the existence of enormous problems, even irregularities, in Mali’s mining sector” and recommended “improvements, especially regarding the methods used in mining operations. To make this activity a genuine economic springboard for Mali, institutional reforms are essential.”

The report immediately drew its first challenges. The methodology used by Mazars and Iventus was criticised, and certain experts were singled out for having previously worked for audited mining companies. These alleged shortcomings did not, however, prevent the Malian state from entering into tough and lengthy negotiations with the firms concerned, aimed both at addressing the issues raised by the audit and at revisiting the terms of the contracts binding them to the Malian state.

With a new Mining Code adopted in the meantime, in August 2023, the objective then became to secure an agreement allowing existing conventions to be migrated to this new “development” code.

Legal escalation, arrests of executives and arbitration

In October 2024, the situation escalated further with a government statement accusing the Canadian group of failing to meet its commitments. The case was referred to the courts and an arrest warrant was issued for the group’s CEO, Mark Bristow, followed by the arrest, on 24 November of the same year, of four senior executives from the Loulo-Gounkoto mining complex. The year 2025 opened with a major decision by the Malian authorities: the seizure of just over three tonnes of gold from the complex.

In response, Barrick decided to suspend its activities in Mali three months later. The Malian judiciary stepped up its actions, accusing the mining giant of offences relating to corporate social and environmental responsibility, as well as breaches of foreign-exchange regulations. In other words, Barrick Gold would not have complied with provisions requiring the repatriation of almost all sums generated by international gold sales. These grievances were compounded by taxes and royalties allegedly unpaid over the group’s three decades in Mali. The mining companies argued that, for some of them, the principle of offshore accounts was provided for in their establishment conventions, and that these accounts were used in particular to pay invoices from international suppliers and partners.

According to information reported by Reuters, the Malian government then demanded payment of at least CFA 300 billion in compensation for the alleged breaches, including unpaid taxes for 2020, 2021 and 2022, as well as unpaid dividends.

On 18 December 2024, the situation took another turn when Barrick Gold filed a request for arbitration with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in accordance—according to the company—with the provisions of its establishment conventions with the State of Mali, to address the disputes concerning the Loulo-Gounkoto complex. In a statement, the company described arbitration as “a mechanism that has proven in the past to be an effective tool for strengthening partnerships and finding mutually acceptable solutions through an independent and competent authority”.

The sequence crossed a new threshold in June 2025, when the Bamako Commercial Court decided to place the Loulo and Gounkoto mines under provisional administration. According to stakeholders close to the case, the provisional administrator initiated steps for the return of the three tonnes of gold seized by the Malian authorities. That return would, moreover, have helped finance the mine’s restart activities during the period of provisional administration.

And then, at last, the outcome…

In the end, ICSID did not have time to bring the arbitration to its conclusion. Before the procedure became protracted, the two protagonists returned to the negotiating table for new rounds of talks. It was a broadly smiling Minister of Finance who announced, on 24 November 2025, the conclusion of an agreement with Barrick, bringing an end to all disputes and ongoing proceedings. The announcement was received with relief by sector stakeholders, who saw it as the resolution of a crisis whose effects were beginning to be felt far beyond the Loulo-Gounkoto complex alone.

In its statement, the Canadian firm specified that “all allegations brought against Barrick, its subsidiaries and its employees will be dropped”, and that the necessary legal steps would be taken to secure the release of the four detained executives. The provisional administration of the Loulo-Gounkoto complex would be lifted and Barrick would regain operational control of the site. In return, the company withdrew its request for arbitration before ICSID. On 29 November, the Malian judiciary ordered the release of the executives who had been brought before the courts.

For its part, the Malian government welcomed having secured Barrick’s migration to the 2023 Mining Code, at the cost of abandoning a number of advantages enshrined in earlier codes. The Minister of Finance also highlighted Barrick Gold’s payment of nearly USD 430 million—equivalent to CFA 244 billion—to the public treasury.

In the background, 2025 also saw a change in governance at the top of the group, with Mark Bristow’s departure from the chief executive role in the autumn and the appointment of an interim CEO tasked with leading a phase of strategic review. Officially, Barrick framed this shift as part of a broader reflection on its asset portfolio. For many observers, however, it is difficult not to link this change of direction to the Malian sequence, which will remain one of the most tense episodes in the group’s presence in Africa.

Despite this resolution, several questions remain unanswered. Trade unions have pointed out that thousands of jobs were threatened by the suspension of operations and the placement under provisional administration, and that the way such crises are managed will have a lasting impact on confidence between the state, investors and local communities.

In an internal note received by our newsroom on 17 December 2025, Sebastiaan Bock, Barrick Mining Corporation’s Director of Operations for Africa and the Middle East, informed mine workers that, as of 16 December 2025, operational control had been returned—by decision of the Commercial Court—to the Loulo-Gounkoto management bodies. Barrick described this decision, marking the end of the provisional administrator’s interlude, as an “important and positive” step.

Thus ended what came to be known as the Barrick affair against the State of Mali.