How Mali intends to achieve its mining and energy sovereignty by the 2063 horizon?

To achieve the changes necessary for the realization of Mali Kura in an increasingly uncertain and unstable international context, we must adopt a long-term vision by engaging in a reflection on possible futures leading to the formulation of a development vision by the 2063 horizon.

It is with this strong promise that the President of the Malian Transition, Army General Assimi Goïta, introduces the Vision 2063 document entitled “Mali Kura ntaasira ka ben san 2063 ma” and the National Development Strategy of Mali. This document gives significant space to mining and energy issues, making these two sectors pillars of the affirmation of national sovereignty. By the 2063 horizon, how does Mali intend to mobilize national energy and mining assets to reduce economic and financial dependencies?

Starting from a diagnosis of the country’s global situation, Vision 2063 is a projection linked to the best political and technical choices for Mali’s future over the next forty years. Aiming to make the best use of evaluations and lessons learned from the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development (CREDD 2019-2023) and the National Prospective Study Mali 2025, this foresight document is presented as the condensation of a sum of complex reflections, capitalizing on the great resilience capacity Mali has shown in recent years. Considering the multitude of crises – security, political, health, economic and even social and societal, sanctions from regional and international bodies, or the recent energy crisis – the future appears dark, a darkness that the Vision 2063 document intends to illuminate with a new trajectory of inclusive and sustainable development for Mali.

● A strategic direction to transform Mali.

It is the nature of any foresight document to propose a new direction. That of the Malian authorities is no exception. “The new Vision must chart the path of development by the 2063 horizon and mark strong options that raise the country’s ambitions towards economic emergence, considering its economic potential and opportunities, the deep springs of economic and social resilience the country has shown when tested by the unjust, illegal and inhumane sanctions imposed on it.” It was in these terms that the then Prime Minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, set the stage for this Vision, developed as a white paper intended to be a reference for building the future, covering a period of forty years broken down into four decennial phases (2024-2033, 2034-2043, 2044-2053, 2054-2063).

Of the three scenarios from the Prospective Study (Scenario 1: Renewal; Scenario 2: Disappointment; Scenario 3: The Unacceptable), the authorities opted for the first, known as the MALI KURA scenario. It is based on the hypothesis that the dynamic initiated by the Transition has been continued and consolidated, and has substantially benefited Malian populations from the returns of mineral resource exploitation.

This is a historical reference reminding us, according to the Vision 2063 document, that mining activity must henceforth be part “of a sustainable development project on the social, economic and environmental level for the entire Malian territory, with particular emphasis on the communities and regions hosting mining sites.” The historical link is not perceptible, however, if one sticks to the legend of Kankou Moussa, Emperor of Mali (reigned 1312-1337), who is known to have transported and distributed a large quantity of Malian gold.

● Energy: the quest for independence and a sustainable mix.

When the stated ambition is to develop heavy industries to initiate the transformation of the national economy, the issue of access to energy is highlighted. This is the second structuring project of Vision 2063 out of the eleven selected.

Soberly entitled “Lighting Mali” (Yelen Kuran in Bambara), this project, like the others, is conceived as a lever for realizing the vision, but also as an integrating point and foundation for an overall projection that disregards the sectoral approach characteristic of many multi-year programs initiated in Mali. The project’s objective is equally soberly stated: “To develop energy resources where they are abundant to achieve economies of scale and profit from the comparative advantages of different production sources.”

The direction is thus set. Mali wants to develop the potential of competitive energy resources for clean electricity production. This involves strengthening and developing transport and storage infrastructure to accelerate and generalize the densification of the interconnected national grid. By the very end of its implementation, Vision 2063 is expected to enable electricity production of sufficient quality and quantity, at lower cost, for all economic actors and households. The projection is maximalist by 2063, with Mali aiming to achieve an electricity access rate of 100% compared to 55.8% in 2023. This projection is also significant for the energy mix. The penetration rate of renewable energy in the energy mix will experience exponential growth, reaching 70% in 2063 compared to 11.3% in 2023. To achieve this, Mali intends to increase its electricity production from 587 MW in 2023 to 12,844 MW in 2063. This is a giant step to be taken in a complex context where means have not always matched the stated political will. Nuclear power is highlighted without a real proposal for its contribution to this giant step. It is cited as an alternative source without giving a real overview of the strategy the Malian State would like to implement to exploit its full potential. This is all the more curious given that Mali and Russia committed in June 2025 to developing civil nuclear energy projects, including the possible construction of low-power nuclear power plants by Rosatom (editor’s note: Russian state atomic energy corporation and giant conglomerate dominating the global civil nuclear sector – see box).

● Between visionary ambition and on-the-ground realities.

The foresight document for the 2063 horizon is characterized by a real ambition commensurate with the aspirations of a people who have experienced complex periods in recent decades. Ambition alone not always being enough, it was important to put Vision 2063 through a concrete analysis grid.

The 2024-2033 budget framework of the National Strategy for Emergence and Sustainable Development (SNEDD 2024-2033) shows a total implementation cost, for the optimistic scenario, of 61,232 billion CFA francs, an average annual cost of 6,123 billion CFA francs. Considering that budget revenues for the 2026 fiscal year amount to 3,057 billion CFA francs, a gap of 3,066 billion CFA francs remains relative to the Vision’s framework. This gap does not inspire confidence in the ability to mobilize financial means to regularly and sustainably support the implementation of Vision 2063’s structuring projects.

Financing thus becomes the backbone of the quest for national sovereignty in the mining and energy sectors. How to mobilize additional internal resources in a context of growing debt and persistent dependence on foreign direct investment? The promise of an energetically autonomous Mali risks colliding with the harsh reality of depleted public coffers and the State’s limited capacity to channel national savings towards long-term projects. On another front, it must be recognized that the stated ambition is fully impacted by a current context marked by repeated crises, revealing a gap between decennial projections and daily emergencies. On the energy issue, populations are already experiencing the crisis with blackouts that paralyze the economy and weaken citizen trust. The sustainability of ambitions will then depend on the ability to articulate immediate responses with future needs for energy infrastructure. Without this articulation, Vision 2063 risks remaining a foresight exercise disconnected from social realities. Finally, the security dimension cannot be overlooked either. Residual and sometimes targeted attacks by terrorist groups on economic interests offer no appreciable margins for the realization of major infrastructure projects. This could lead to delays in overall programming, creating a dissonance between ambition, political promise and on-the-ground achievements.

Mining and energy sovereignty must not remain a pious wish. It must be built in an environment where security, governance and transparency become sine qua non conditions. This quest for sovereignty should not be limited to these two resources. Indeed, the question of water, a vital resource, must be the third pillar for a perceptible implementation by populations of the changes brought about by the conduct of Vision 2063.

By Baba Sakho

Rosatom: a partner already positioned.

Mentioned in Vision 2063 as an alternative source, the Malian nuclear option most likely refers to low-power SMR-type plants (Small Modular Reactors), which Rosatom is already offering to several partner countries. Indeed, Mali and Russia signed a cooperation agreement in June 2025 in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy, with the background hypothesis of a low-power Russian nuclear plant project.
However, such a choice cannot be implemented quickly. For a country new to nuclear energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recalls that it generally takes 10 to 15 years of preparation between the initial decision and the operation of a first plant. This phase involves establishing a legal and regulatory framework, a regulatory authority, human skills, safety and security mechanisms, guarantees, and successive authorizations before construction and operation. SMRs do not derogate from these requirements, even if they are presented as more flexible to deploy. Added to these requirements, in a context like Mali’s, are high imperatives for securing sites, sensitive materials and critical infrastructure, making institutional and territorial stability a central parameter of any civil nuclear projection.